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Note 
 
The International Rule of Law: An Analysis 
 
Monica P. Moyo 
 
On November 15, 1989, the United Nations General 
Assembly declared 1990–1999 the “United Nations Decade of 
International Law.”
1
 In that proclamation lay buried the 
centuries-old hope for a just international order ruled by law 
and based on the “rule of law.”
2
 Today, the rule of law is 
generally thought to be the panacea for the irregularities and 
arbitrariness that politics brings into social relations and 
matters of governance. Moreover, although the evidence is 
inconclusive, the rule of law is associated with the 
advancement of ideals such as democracy, human rights, and 
economic development.
3
 Thus, the rule of law is considered a 
necessity for social progress within a globalized world.
4
  
Despite its popularity, however, the concept of the rule of 
law is fraught with definitional and practical application 
challenges.
5
 In a 2004 report on the rule of law, then U.N. 
 
   J.D. candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. The author 
thanks Professor Robert Stein for reading drafts of the Note and  encouraging 
her to submit it for publication.   
 1. G.A. Res. 44/23, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/23 (Nov. 15, 1989). 
 2. See infra pp. 4–8. 
 3. See generally Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, Competing Definitions of the 
Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners, 55 DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW 
PROJECT 5, 5 (2005) (indicating that despite the scant evidence that the rule of 
law has actually resulted in these outcomes, between 1985 and 2005 the 
international community spent over a billion dollars in rule of law building in 
underdeveloped countries and transitioning democracies). See also Tor Krever, 
The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World 
Bank’s Development Model, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 294 (2011). 
 4. See generally PHILIP ALLOTT, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF 
LAW: ESSAYS IN INTEGRATED CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2005) (discussing the 
possibilities of an internationalized rule of law). 
 5. See id. for a discussion of how some of the definitional challenges of 
the concept can be attributed to the varying lenses through which 
practitioners viewed the concept during their respective periods in history. For 
example, post-Communism practitioners viewed the rule of law in terms of the 
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Secretary General, Kofi Annan, noted the need for a “common 
understanding” of the concept and the need to promote it at 
both international and national levels.
6
 Calls to 
internationalize the rule of law are often uncritically premised 
on the assumption that the concept can be applied similarly in 
national and international systems alike despite their 
structural, political, and legal differences. The practical 
challenges of applying the concept to the international arena 
are amply documented,
7
 so scholars and practitioners often 
focus their efforts and analyses on how international structures 
might be adjusted to make such structures more receptive to 
the diffusion of the norm. Beyond trying to explain its 
elements, scholars have done little to understand and explain 
what Thomas Carothers termed the norm’s “essence”
8
 and what 
impact this might have on its application. 
This Note seeks to explain the essence of the concept of the 
“international rule of law”
9
 and how it might be effectively 
applied in inter-state relations. Section I outlines the 
definitional challenges associated with the rule of law generally 
and the problem with its international application. Section II 
deconstructs the concept of the rule of law, analyzes its 
problematic assumptions, and explains how these assumptions 
are in conflict with what is known about the structure of the 
international system. Section III argues that a significant 
obstacle to the realization of an international rule of law is the 
concept’s lack of a theory of justice, and offers a socio-legal 
framework within which such a theory might be implemented. 
Although many aspects of this Note’s critique can be applied to 
the domestic arena, its focus is international.  
 
institutions in need of reform and emphasized institutions in their definitions 
of the concept. In Latin America the focus was on judicial reform, while 
proponents in Eastern Europe emphasized legal change and, later, rule of law 
institution reform.  
 6. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616* (Aug. 23, 2004) 
(“U.N. Secretary-General”) (noting the multiplicity of definitions associated 
with the concept and the overlap with security sector reform at the operational 
level).  
 7. See infra p. 11 and note 37 and accompanying text. 
 8. Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of 
Knowledge, 34 DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW PROJECT 5, 8 (2003) (noting 
that “practitioners know what the rule of law is supposed to look like in 
practice, but they are less certain what the essence of the rule of law is”). 
 9. Throughout this Note, the phrase “international rule of law” will be 
used to refer to how the concept of the rule of law is understood and applied in 
inter-state relations. 
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I. UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
A. DEFINING THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Articulations of the rule of law can be found as early as the 
medieval period.
10
 Most modern conceptions of the idea can be 
traced to the writings of Albert Venn Dicey, the scholar 
credited with coining the term.
11
 Although Dicey offered a view 
of the rule of law within the international arena, he situated 
his understanding primarily within the domestic,
12
 and most 
theorists have done the same. The idea of an internationalized 
rule of law, therefore, is in many ways an emerging norm.
13
 
At the heart of the challenge of internationalizing the rule 
of law is the fact that, despite its long history and popularity in 
both legal and political discourse, the very idea of the rule of 
law remains vague and uncertain.
14
 Judith Shklar referred to it 
as “a bit of ruling class chatter” which had become 
“meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-
use.”
15
 Others have argued that the concept has wide 
theoretical acceptance precisely because its meaning is unclear 
in practice.
16
  
Dicey argued that the rule of law has three essential 
 
 10. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Origins of the Rule of Law, in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 162 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., 1960). 
 11. See H. W. Arndt, The Origins of Dicey’s Concept of the “Rule of Law,” 
31 THE AUSTRALIAN L. J. 117 (1957). 
 12. RICHARD A. COSGROVE, THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY, 
VICTORIAN JURIST (1987). 
 13. See Stéphane Beaulac, The Rule of Law in International Law Today, 
in RELOCATING THE RULE OF LAW 220 (Gianluigi Palombella & Neil Walker 
eds., 2009) (describing “an emerging ‘international rule of law’, in terms of the 
externalisation of rule of law values”); see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE 
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91, 127 (2004) (noting that the 
international rule of law “has only just begun”). 
 14. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210–229 (Joseph Raz ed., 1979). See also, 
Olufemi Taiwo, The Rule of Law: The New Leviathan?, 12 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 151, 154 (1999) (noting that “[i]t is very difficult to talk about 
the 'rule of law'. There are almost as many conceptions of the rule of law as 
there are people defending it”). 
 15. Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE 
OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan 
eds., 1987). 
 16. Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
331, 331–361 (2008). 
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components: (1) the regulation of government power, (2) 
equality before the law, and (3) the presence of an effective 
judicial system.
17
 This view has become associated with all 
formal understandings of the rule of law and is often the 
foundation upon which other, more substantive understandings 
of the concept are built.
18
 While the formal aspects of the 
concept focus on Dicey’s three elements, the substantive 
aspects focus on the content of the law itself.
19
 Given the wide 
spectrum of understandings within these two categories, 
scholars have created a continuum that runs from “thin” to 
“thick.” The thin or formal conceptions include elements such 
as “rule by law” or “formal legality,” and the thick include 
individual rights or matters of dignity and justice.
20
  
A number of normative principles have been used to define 
the thick or substantive understanding of the rule of law, 
including fairness in adjudication, clarity of law, limitation of 
discretion, ability to resolve civil disputes appropriately, and 
equal application of law.
21
 Other elements of a thick 
understanding of the rule of law include respect for 
international law
22
 as well as moral values such as the 
preservation of the “dignity, equality, and human rights of all 
persons.”
23
 In light of the multiplicity of views of the concept, 
 
 17. COSGROVE, supra note 12.  
 18. See, e.g., Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, The Rule of Law, Remarks to 
the American Bar Association, C-SPAN (Aug. 5, 2006), http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program/193757-1 (echoing Dicey’s principles, but also noting 
that in conceptions of the rule of law, the law must also “respect and preserve 
the dignity, equality, and human rights of all persons”). 
 19. See, e.g., Lord Bingham, Lecture at the Center for Public Law: The 
Rule of Law, CPL (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk 
/past_activities/the_rule_of_law_text_transcript.php. 
 20. TAMANAHA, supra note 13, at 91. See also Randall Peerenboom, 
Varieties of Rule of Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE 
AND THE US 1 (Randall Peerenboom ed. 2004). 
 21. Bingham, supra note 19. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 20
th
 Sultan Azlan Shah Law Lecture in 
Kualar Lumpur, Malaysia: Written Constitutions and the Common Law 
Tradition 11 (Aug. 10, 2006). See also Mark Ellis, Toward a Common Ground 
Definition of the Rule of Law Incorporating Substantive Principles of Justice, 
72 U. PITT. L. REV. 191, 199 (2010) (noting the need for respect of fundamental 
rights and arguing that “a country that has a solid institutional legal 
framework but fails to protect fundamental human rights is at best a country 
ruled by the law but should not be considered a country based on the rule of 
law”) (emphasis added). There is continued disagreement as to whether these 
are elements or by-products of the rule of law. See, e.g., Hans Corell, A 
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some scholars have held that the rule of law is an ideal
24
 rather 
than something to be attained.
25
 Support for the rule of law as a 
political ideal is found among those concerned with its 
manifestation in inter-state relations.
26
 In international affairs, 
one must ask which of the myriad views of the concept is best 
for the international order and who should make this 
determination. 
 
B. UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 
 
To determine the meaning of the rule of law in 
international affairs, it is important to examine the U.N. 
Charter–the multilateral instrument and constitutive 
document upon which the post-World War II international 
order is established.
27
 Although the phrase “rule of law” is not 
found in the provisions of the Charter, the principle is found in 
the Preamble and presented as one of the four goals of the U.N. 
The goal is “to establish conditions under which justice and the 
respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other 
sources of international law can be maintained.”
28
 The U.N. 
 
Challenge to the United Nations and the World: Developing the Rule of Law, 18 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 391 (2004) (noting that the rule of law includes 
democracy and respect for human rights). But see Krever, supra note 3, at 294 
(noting that democracy and human rights are not part of the rule of law but its 
by-product). 
 24. See generally, WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN 282 (1951) (discussing the ideological connotations 
that attach to the rule of law among democratic states and how they differ 
from those under authoritarian regimes).  
 25. See, e.g., Robert A. Stein, Rule of Law: What does it Mean?, 18 MINN J. 
INT’L. L. 293, 303 (2009) (arguing that the rule of law in a “purist sense, is an 
ideal, a goal, something to be strived for. As an ideal, it is never fully 
achieved”).  
 26. See, e.g., Chesterman, supra note 16, at 360 (arguing that viewing the 
rule of law as a political ideal “properly locates the conduct of most 
international affairs in the political rather than the strictly legal sphere”). 
 27. See generally, U.N. Charter Preamble; see also, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). Declaration on the Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United States, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 121 (Oct. 
24, 1970), recognizes the inherent link between the UN and the international 
rule of law. Its preamble emphasizes “the paramount importance of the 
Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among 
nations.” 
 28. U.N. Charter Preamble, supra note 27. The other three goals as 
presented in the Preamble of the U.N. Charter are: “[1] to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
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maintains that “the concept of the rule of law is deeply linked 
to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability 
and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the 
prevention and punishment of wrongs.”
29
 
In his 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Annan presented a 
view of the rule of law that is at once idealist, functionalist, 
formal, and substantive, with an aim of making it applicable at 
both national and international levels.
30
 Annan described the 
rule of law as a principle of governance characterized by the 
following: accountability of all actors, public promulgation of 
law, equal enforcement, independent adjudication, consistency 
with international human rights norms and standards, legal 
certainty, procedural and legal transparency, and so on.
31
 
Bolstering the view that the U.N.’s understanding of the 
concept is thick or substantive, Annan noted that the 
normative foundation for the organization’s advancement of the 
rule of law is the U.N. Charter, international human rights 
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal 
law, and international refugee law.
32
 These bodies of law carry 
both concrete and aspirational norms, an attribute that often 
undermines clarity and, in turn, the international application 
of the rule of law.
33
 Annan noted that the U.N. would promote 
 
untold sorrow to mankind [2] to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small . . . and [4] to promote social progress 
and better standards of life in larger freedom.”  
 29. What is the Rule of Law?, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, 
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3 (last visited Sept. 19, 2013). 
 30. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 6, at ¶ 6 (noting that “the rule of 
law is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission” and 
explaining what it might mean and what additional measures may be required 
to operationalize it). 
 31. Id. (The rule of law is “a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international 
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency”). 
 32. Id. at ¶ 9. 
 33. This is a particularly important issue because fragmentation, or the 
problems that have arisen as a result of the diversification and expansion of 
international law, undermines the clarity of norms in international law. For 
comprehensive treatment of this subject, see generally Rep. of the Study Group 
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the rule of law at national and international levels.
34
 This 
vision was affirmed at the 2005 World Summit Outcome and at 
the General Assembly’s 2012 High Level meeting on the Rule of 
Law at the National and International Levels.
35
 Annan’s views 
beg the question whether the rule of law can be applied 
similarly within the domestic and international arenas. 
Furthermore, given states’ preferences for systems with which 
they are familiar, conceptions of an international rule of law 
tend to mirror understandings of what the concept means 
within a national system.
36
  
There are many problems associated with applying 
domestic understandings of the rule of law to international 
affairs. Judge Higgins of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) summarized the problems when she asked:  
 
“How then, in this national model, should an 
‘international rule of law’ look? First, there should be 
an executive reflecting popular choice, taking non-
arbitrary decisions applicable to all, for the most part 
judicially-reviewable for constitutionality, laws 
known to all, applied equally to all, and independent 
courts to resolve legal disputes and to hold 
accountable violations of criminal law, itself applying 
the governing legal rules in a consistent matter. One 
has only to state this set of propositions to see the 
problems.”
37
 
 
of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, May 1– 
June 9, July 3– Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) 
(“Fragmentation of International Law”). 
 34. U.N. Secretary General, supra note 6, at ¶ 6. 
 35. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 134, U.N Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 66/102, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/102 (Jan. 
13, 2012) (“Reaffirming also the need for universal adherence to and 
implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international levels 
and its solemn commitment to an international order based on the rule of law 
and international law, which, together with the principles of justice, is 
essential for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among States. . .”). 
 36. See Frank Schimmelfennig, A Comparison of the Rule of Law 
Promotion Policies of Major Western Powers, in RULE OF LAW DYNAMICS 115 
(Michael Zurn, Andre Nollkaemper, & Randall Peerenboom eds., 2012) 
(explaining that this is so because such similarities create “a legal 
environment that they are familiar with and know to use to their benefit”).  
 37. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks at the United Nations University: 
The ICJ and the Rule of Law (Apr. 11, 2007) (available at http://collection.unu-
mc.org/view/UNU:2363). 
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Unlike the domestic arena where it guides a vertical 
relationship between a subject and a sovereign, international 
application of the norm is particularly troublesome because in 
international relations the norm must guide a horizontal 
relationship between equal sovereigns.
38
 Jeremy Waldron noted 
that analogizing states within an international system to 
individuals within a domestic setting is problematic because 
states are subjects of international law, as well its officials and 
sources.
39
 Further demonstrating the depth of the conceptual 
problem of an international rule of law, Waldron argued that 
states are not human beings, but they exist for the sake of 
human beings.
40
 In other words, international law is meant to 
ensure the wellbeing of human beings rather than state 
freedom,
41
 yet formulations of an international rule of law 
based on a domestic analogy would privilege the latter.  
The question of whether an international rule of law is 
possible is inextricably linked to the traditional question of 
whether international law can be said to rule at all. The former 
question addresses whether the various elements attached to 
understandings of the rule of law are possible at the 
international level, while the latter addresses the efficacy of the 
norms articulated in various international legal instruments. 
Chesterman argued that when the rule of law is understood in 
the core, formal sense, one need only consider the international 
judicial systems and the processes of law-making to reasonably 
conclude that “there is presently no such thing as the 
international rule of law.”
42
 
Other scholars disagree. Beaulac, for instance, argued that 
the formal aspects of the rule of law are, to a large extent, 
already reflected in the international legal system.
43
 To support 
this view, first, he pointed out the presence of norms having the 
 
 38. Chesterman, supra note 16, at 358 (adding that structural issues must 
also take into account “the historical and political context within which the 
rule of law was developed”). 
 39. See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 16, 23 (2007) (noting also that although individuals can become 
sources of law within a municipal system through contracts, there are many 
sources of law within such a system that are not dependent on individuals, but 
only a few in international law not dependent on states).  
 40. Id. at 24. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Chesterman, supra note 38, at 358. 
 43. Beaulac, supra note 13, at 208. 
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characteristics of law and providing certainty, predictability, 
and stability to the system, and limiting the use of arbitrary 
power.
44
 Second, Beaulac argued that international norms are 
adequately created and equally applied among states, citing as 
evidence the voluntary and sometimes widespread ratification 
of treaties by states.
45
 Third, he argued that the international 
system has “adjudicative enforcement of normativity,” 
supporting this assertion by pointing out the existence of the 
ICJ, which is capable of adjudicating all legal disputes between 
states.
46
 He acknowledged, however, that this view of the ICJ 
was “a mere illusion” given the limits imposed on the court by 
state consent, but maintained that this is “not so bad” because 
states do not have to give their consent on a case-by-case 
basis.
47
 Acknowledging the limits of his chosen variables, 
Beaulac argued that overall at the normative and functional 
levels a strong case can be made for the existence of an 
international rule of law, much like that at the domestic level, 
but that significant challenges remain at the institutional 
 
 44. Id. (noting that “international law is regarded as true positive law, 
which forms part of a real legal system, in which ‘every international situation 
is capable of being determined as a matter of law’”(quoting 1 ROBERT 
JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (Longman 
Group, 9th ed. 1992))). 
 45. Beaulac, supra note 13, at 208 (noting, for example, that the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties is widely ratified and that even those states 
that have not ratified the instrument recognize that they are bound by its 
provisions because they embody customary norms). To support the idea of 
equal application, Beaulac pointed to the fact that international law applies to 
all states not just a few, with all members having the same duties and 
obligations. See id. at 210 (noting that normativity requires the application of 
law to all members, and finding that in international law the requirement of 
legal objectivity with regards to political subjectivity is met). However, he also 
defined equality as “whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any 
other; and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the other” 
(quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 
(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1863)), but did not address the practical 
challenges of the legal notion of sovereign equality. They chose instead to focus 
on the codification of the norm in instruments such as the U.N. Charter and 
the Declarations on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
 46. Beaulac, supra note 13, at 212–13. 
 47. Id. at 214. But see, Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law 36 
GERMAN Y.B INT’L. L. 15, 37 (1993) (noting that “such a purely consensual 
basis for the judicial settlement of legal disputes cannot be satisfactory in 
terms of the rule of law.”). For the basis of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, see Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, art. 34–38. 
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level.
48
  
Unlike Beaulac, political realists are skeptical about the 
possibility of both a rule of international law and an 
international rule of law. This is largely because realists tend 
to ground their analyses not in the external indicia of the rule 
of law but on the structure of the international system. Political 
realists view the international system as anarchic and states as 
entities driven primarily by self-interest.
49
 Basing their 
reasoning on presuppositions of neoclassical realism, some 
modern legal scholars have argued that international law 
serves the self-interest of states and it does not, on its own, 
carry sufficient normative strength to compel states to act 
contrary to their interests.
50
 Thus the international rule of law 
is conceptualized as an instrumentalist construct with states 
having no moral obligation to comply with international law.
51
 
From this perspective, the concept is unstable; it could be thick 
or thin depending on the prevailing interests of the most 
influential states.  
 
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF 
LAW 
 
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the concept 
of the rule of law is fraught with both theoretical and practical 
application problems. However, the norm continues to be 
 
 48. Beaulac, supra note 13 at 221. 
 49. For a comprehensive treatment of political realism, see HANS J. 
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE (5
th
 ed., 1973). In support of his views, Morgenthau presented six 
principles of political realism: (1) politics is governed by objective laws rooted 
in human nature; (2) interest is defined in terms of power; (3) power is an 
objective and universally valid category; (4) political action has moral 
significance; (5) moral laws of a particular nation are not necessarily the same 
as those that govern the universe; (6) realism is based on pluralistic view of 
human nature. See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1979) (explaining the key propositions of neo-classical realism). 
 50. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (2005) (arguing that the behavioral features of 
international law, particularly compliance, are “better explained by a theory of 
self-interest than by the various alternatives”).  
 51. Id. at 202 (arguing that international law must be excluded from ideas 
of moral reasons for compliance and noting that “[s]tates could have an 
intrinsic desire to comply with international law for reasons other than moral 
obligation. It is possible that even if states did not have a moral obligation to 
comply with international law, citizens and leaders might think that the state 
has an obligation to comply with international law.”). 
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understood as fundamentally apolitical—objective in conception 
and application—because of the belief that it facilitates the 
actualization of some objective notion of justice. To suggest that 
the rule of law is, in fact, a political preference or concept is to 
say that as a regulatory instrument it lacks the stability 
needed to ensure consistent and predictable outcomes in inter-
state relations. Thus, for rule of law proponents, “the fight for 
an international rule of law is a fight against politics.”
52
 With 
understandings of the rule of law pitting law against politics, 
politics is viewed as representing the arbitrary application of 
power based on the preferences of influential groups,
53
 while 
law is associated with neutrality and, hence, the attainment of 
justice. At the heart of this view is the faulty assumption that 
the law itself is apolitical and embodies justice.
54
 
The following section challenges this assumption and 
argues that the law is, in fact, political; it is neither neutral nor 
objective and it does not have intrinsic value.
55
 By deduction, 
the concept of the rule of law is likewise not politically neutral 
as the law’s substantive content embodies politically motivated 
preferences and interests, and any application of the rule of law 
leads to politically influenced outcomes that may or may not be 
just. Furthermore, this Note argues that presenting the 
international rule of law as politically neutral creates both 
conceptual and application problems.  
 
 
A.  THE LAW IS NOT APOLITICAL  
 
 52. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 4, 5 (1990), http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/1/1/1144.pdf (indicating also that this 
fight is “understood as a matter of furthering subjective desires and leading 
into an international anarchy”).  
 53. Id. at 6 (arguing that the rule of law among states, articulated within 
the UN in the late 1980s was “yet another liberal impulse to escape politics”).  
 54. See John Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 199, 
201 (explaining how citizens come to believe that “law is a body of consistent, 
politically neutral rules that can be objectively applied”). See also Hilary 
Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 613, 85 (1991) (noting that “[a] central feature of many western theories 
about law is that the law is an autonomous entity, distinct from the society it 
regulates. A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic 
system, for example, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, 
and is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and 
objectivity”). 
 55. Wade Channel, Lessons not yet Learned: Problems with Western Aid 
for Law Reform in Postcommunist Countries, 57 DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF L. 
PROJECT 3, 8 (2005). 
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To be objective, the law needs to be both concrete and 
normative.
56
 However, the more concrete a rule, the less 
normative it becomes; too much concreteness leads to 
arguments that the law is political (providing a defense for 
existing structures) and too much normativity leads to 
arguments that the law is idealist, with judgments of what is 
desirable based on political preferences.
57
 Either way, legal 
rules are inherently entwined with politics, making political 
preferences a necessary component of law and subsequently the 
concept of the rule of law. Koskenniemi reasoned that although 
some politics is inevitable in the formulation of law, “it should 
be constrained by non-political rules.”
58
 
The political nature of law is particularly apparent in 
international law. The formation, content, and application of 
international law reveal political preferences, interests, and 
competing values.
59
 At treaty formation, states negotiate the 
contents of various agreements based on their national 
interests. The resulting content reflects compromises and the 
values of the signatories to the extent that the views of all are 
taken into consideration. International law norms are 
characterized as hard or soft law, rules and principles, jus 
cogens, and so on, based on the political choices of the states 
that are involved in their creation, impacting the weight given 
to the various instruments. Furthermore, although states can 
be bound by customary law to which they have not 
affirmatively consented (unless they are persistent objectors), 
states are bound by treaty norms to the extent they consent to 
being so bound, which is another political choice. Moreover, the 
application of the rules will often depend on the forum in which 
any conflict is resolved. The political preferences of the 
reviewer (whether it be the Security Council or the ICJ, for 
 
 56. See Koskenniemi, supra note 52, at 7 (arguing that in the modern 
view the concreteness of law is found in that law is understood as “an artificial 
creation not a natural one,” and the normativity of law requires application in 
spite of political preferences).  
 57. Id. at 8. 
 58. Id. at 5. 
 59. The development of international criminal law provides a stark 
example of the role of politics in the creation of law. See generally ROBERT 
CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 144–179 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the problems that plagued the 
lengthy negotiations at the creation of the Rome Statute and the lack of 
travaux preparatoires documenting the reasoning and history behind 
controversial provisions). 
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example) will affect the interpretation of legal norms, much 
like judges within domestic systems are often influenced by 
political preferences in their interpretation of the law.
60
 
Although the manner in which various agreements are 
created supports the idea of sovereign equality and the rule of 
law’s principle of fairness in the creation of law, it obscures the 
realities of unequal bargaining power and the fact that weaker 
states often acquiesce to sub-optimal or unfavorable terms that 
are disproportionally advantageous to more influential states.
61
 
The types of rules that thicker conceptions of the rule of law 
might propagate, such as those embodying ideals of fairness 
and justice will tend to have soft law status. They might be 
absorbed into the system as aspirational norms, written in 
vague language, viewed as progressively realizable rather than 
immediately applicable, and lacking enforcement capability.
62
 
States ratify international human rights treaties, which are 
 
 60. See Hasnas, supra note 54 at 232 (“The law is an amalgam of 
contradictory rules and counter-rules expressed in inherently vague language 
that can yield a legitimate legal argument for any desired conclusion.”). 
 61. This is particularly true of free trade agreements. An example is the 
impact of NAFTA on Mexican farmers. In this case, the 7% annual growth 
that had been promised to Mexico at signing became only 1.6% as the US 
continued to subsidize its farmers and use non-tariff barriers against Mexican 
products. For a discussion of NAFTA’s impact on Mexico, see JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 64–66 (1st ed. 2006). 
 62. An example is the legal architecture of the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES 
2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966), whose language is primarily aspirational, in part 
because of the recognition that economic development is a process. Except for 
the minimum standard requirements, the Covenant leaves states with no real 
enforceable legal obligations towards one another (though the norms are 
justiciable within states). Another example is the manner in which norms 
concerning the human rights obligations of transnational corporations are 
developing. The U.N.’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 
which might have aided in holding transnational corporations accountable for 
human rights violations, were effectively dismantled by Special 
Representative John Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework,”U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011), which presented such 
corporations’ respect for rights as their responsibility rather than their legal 
duty. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enter. with Regard to 
Human Rights U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003); Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Guiding Principles on Bus and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework”, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 
21, 2011). 
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arguably the moral core of international law, with declarations, 
understandings, and reservations, which further articulate 
their political preferences, and in some ways compromise the 
robustness of the norms.
63
 This process often results in treaties 
with unenforceable norms and dispute resolution that is left to 
political rather than legal processes.
64
 Furthermore, the 
flexibility of the norms in much of international law arguably 
reflects recognition of the primacy of politics rather than law in 
international relations and states’ preference for the same. The 
political nature of international law is, therefore, inescapable. 
With the law itself being political and its validity as an 
impartial referee of international affairs questionable, it is 
difficult to sustain an argument that the rule of law is 
apolitical
65
 and, therefore, a suitable arbiter. Even the three 
principles that underpin the thin or formal understandings of 
the rule of law—supremacy of law, equality before the law, and 
an effective judiciary—are political preferences. These three 
attributes have a veneer of objectivity, but they can only be 
politically neutral if the law itself were so. As Zurn and 
Reinhold noted, “even formal conceptions of the rule of law are 
never politically neutral, because the rules about the rules are 
as much products of power struggles as the rules themselves.”
66
 
This fundamental incongruity within understandings of the 
concept of the rule of law makes its application to an 
international system of autonomous political units, built on and 
governed primarily by political principles, at best difficult and, 
at worst, unjust.
67
  
 
 63. See generally Eric Neumayer, Qualified Ratification: Explaining 
Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 397, 
401 (2007) (explaining the impact of reservations, declarations, and 
understandings on the efficacy of human rights norms). An example of a 
heavily reserved human rights treaty is the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, where the most reserved provisions (articles 2 
and 16) arguably embody the object and purpose of the instrument. 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 
34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979). 
 64. Neumayer, supra note 63, at 401. 
 65. See Belton, supra note 3, at 810 (noting that rule of law ends are 
historically and culturally determined). 
 66. See Michael Zürn & Theresa Reinold, Rule of Law Promotion and 
Legalization Beyond the Nation-State, WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN FÜR 
SOZIALFORSCHUNG, http://www.wzb.eu/en/research/international-politics-and-
law/global-governance/projects/foerderung-der-rule-of-law-und-verrechtlich 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 67. Koskenniemi supra note 52, at 28 (“The Rule of Law constitutes an 
attempt to provide communal life without giving up individual autonomy. 
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B. HOW SOVEREIGNTY IMPACTS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE 
OF LAW 
 
The international system is built on the notion of state 
sovereignty,
68
 a legal and political principle that has been 
described as the most essential quality of a state in 
international law.
69
 Although the concept is plagued with 
definitional problems,
70
 at its core it describes “the supreme 
authority exercised by each state”
71
 in matters concerning its 
territory. Sovereignty complicates the conceptualization and 
application of an international rule of law by: (1) encouraging 
the prioritization of national self-interest in state interactions, 
thereby compromising the fairness of the processes of rule 
creation and the substantive content of the rules and (2) 
making compliance with international law an unreliable 
indicator of the actualization of the rule of law. This Note will 
address these in turn. 
First, although it has been argued that international 
institutions and the forces of globalization are eroding state 
sovereignty, the reality is that the world is still not borderless.
72
 
 
Communal life is, of course, needed to check individualism from leading either 
into anarchy or tyranny. Individualism is needed because otherwise it would 
remain objectionable for those who feel that the kind of community provided 
by it does not meet their political criteria. From their perspective, the law’s 
communitarian pretensions would turn out as totalitarian apologies.”). 
 68. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED 
HYPOCRISY 3–4 (1999) (describing four types of sovereignty: international 
legal sovereignty, which deals with practices associated with mutual 
recognition; Westphalian sovereignty, which deals with political organization 
and the exclusion of external structures; domestic sovereignty, which deals 
with the formal organization of authority within states; and interdependence 
sovereignty, which deals with the ability of public authorities to regulate the 
flow of things across the borders of their state). 
 69. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 81 (The New Press 2000). See also, U.N. Charter art. 2, 
para. 1. 
 70. Much of the confusion stems from the complexity of deconstructing its 
essential elements; for instance, who are its subject and authorizers? There is 
also the difficulty of distinguishing the symbolic from the substantive 
meanings. What is the difference between tyranny and sovereignty? For a 
comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Richard Falk, Sovereignty and 
Human Rights: The Search for Reconciliation, 5 ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY 29, 
32–35 (2000). 
 71. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (9th ed. 2009). 
 72. See J. Samuel Barkin, The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty 
and the Emergence of Human Rights Norms, 27 MILLENIUM J. OF INT’L STUD. 
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States remain primarily responsible for their own territory. 
States may have extraterritorial obligations in some 
instances,
73
 but these remain limited and highly contested 
depending on the area of law.
74
 Because sovereignty is designed 
to protect statehood, it ensures that states will prioritize the 
safeguarding and furtherance of national rather than collective 
self interest in their interactions with other states. This has the 
effect of compromising the U.N.’s goal of international justice. 
Moreover, states, in their sovereign discretion, choose the 
manner in which they will participate in any given legal 
regime, if at all, a practice that tends to undermine the rule of 
law.
75
 
A system of autonomous political units with no supreme 
legislative or administrative authority also ensures that much 
of inter-state interaction will be based on political bargaining 
rather than on legal rules, and those with greater bargaining 
power will tend to dictate the rules of interaction.
76
 Thus, 
sovereignty empowers states to influence both the content and 
application of the law itself. The result is that the law, which is 
supposed to rule, often reflects the preferences of the most 
influential sovereigns.
77
 Sovereign equality remains a legal 
 
229, 232 (1998) (arguing that a “state’s need for certain institutional 
structures to legitimate themselves can act as a significant constraint on 
states’ final authority over their internal affairs”); but see KENNETH N. WALTZ, 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 158 (1979) (arguing that 
interdependence is a myth that “obscures the realities of international 
politics”). Within the European context, however, there is an argument to be 
made for the relinquishment of essential features of sovereignty, including 
free internal movement across borders and the use of a common currency, 
through state participation in the European Union. 
 73. For examples of how extraterritorial obligations apply in international 
human rights law, see CASES AND CONCEPTS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Fons 
Coomans & Rolf Künnemann, eds., 2012). International environmental law 
also regulates activities that might have an effect across boundaries. See, e.g., 
Austen L. Parrish, Trail Smelter Déjà Vu: Extraterritoriality, International 
Environmental Law, and the Search for Solutions to Canadian-U.S. 
Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 415 (2005). 
There are also extraterritorial obligations in international humanitarian law. 
Id. 
 74. Parrish, supra note 74, at 395 (discussing the exception to the general 
presumption against enforcing domestic law extraterritorially in the case of 
environmental law). 
 75. See supra notes 3 and 62 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Hasnas, supra note 54, at 232 (1995) (arguing that the law “will 
always reflect the political ideology of those invested with decisionmaking 
power”). 
 77. Id. 
MOYO Note 2/27/2014  6:10 PM 
2014] INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: ANALYSIS 95 
 
fiction. In this context, a concept of the rule of law that claims 
to be apolitical will inadvertently grant the practice of “rule by 
the powerful” legal and moral legitimacy.  
Second, because of its impact on both state motives and the 
law’s substantive content, sovereignty makes state compliance 
with international law an unreliable indicator of the 
actualization of an international rule of law.
78
 Compliance out 
of a sense of legal duty, even at a state’s expense, would 
demonstrate a commitment to legal norms per se and support 
the argument that there can, in fact, be an international rule of 
law. However, selective compliance, on the other hand, would 
undermine it. Although there is support for Louis Henkin’s 
contention that “almost all nations observe almost all principles 
of international law and almost all of their obligations almost 
all of the time,”
79
 it would be a mistake to interpret it as 
evidence of the rule of law, thick or thin, without assessing 
patterns of compliance within their political context and 
analyzing the content of the law itself.  
Although the compliance question remains largely 
unresolved, in practice, states’ compliance appears to vary 
depending on the area of law.
80
 States may choose to follow 
international aviation rules governing flights, for instance, 
because the international political costs are low and the 
domestic interest of ensuring that citizens are able to travel 
internationally is high.
81
 At other times, they obey rules 
because the political or, more precisely, the reputational costs 
 
 78. See Koskenniemi supra note 52 at 8 (indicating that international 
lawyers have pointed out that “legal rules whose content or application 
depends on the will of the legal subject for whom they are valid are not proper 
legal rules at all but apologies for the legal subject’s political interest”). 
 79. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979). 
 80. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER , supra note 50, at 102–04 (arguing that 
while the idea of doing “the right thing” may explain compliance with certain 
treaty regimes, it does not explain compliance with trade and human rights 
treaties, and noting also that cost-benefit analyses precedes a state’s decision 
to enter into any treaty). But see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2602 (1996–97) (arguing that this 
instrumentalist logic is limited; it does not explain the internalization of legal 
norms in domestic systems through ongoing transnational legal processes). 
The internalization of legal norms, however, does not empty them of their 
political content. Thus, Koh’s view does not support the idea of an 
international rule of law, which is based on objective norms that might 
actualize the elusive idea of justice.  
 81. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS 14 (1995) (arguing that nations “obey powerless rules”). 
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of not doing so are high.
82
 For instance, when there is growing 
consensus around a norm, a state may participate out of fear of 
retaliation or being considered an outcast.
83
 States continue to 
bend the rules or act contrary to them when their self-interest 
so dictates. Thus, national self-interest, rather than loyalty to 
international legal norms out of a sense of moral or legal 
obligation, appears to be the single constant determinant of 
state compliance with international law.
84
 The problem is that 
the concept of rule of law presupposes compliance despite state 
preferences.  
The question that arises is whether there is a formulation 
of the rule of law that is not only sensitive to the complexities 
sovereignty presents, but one that can also be used to further 
the purposes of justice as envisioned by the drafters of the 
Charter.
85
 
 
III. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 
 
The fact that the concept of an international rule of law is 
not apolitical does not necessarily mean the idea must be 
discarded. However, it does mean that the rule of law must be 
understood differently if it is to become fit for international 
application. Because the goal of the rule of law is to realize 
some notion of international justice, it must be grounded in a 
theory of justice.
86
 The formulation of an adequate theory of 
 
 82. GOLDSMITH & POSNER , supra note 50, at 102. 
 83. Roger P. Alford & James Fallows Tierney, Moral Reasoning in 
International Law in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 11 
(Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2011) (indicating that traditional theories of 
compliance present states as complying out of “a desire to avoid sanctions, as 
well as by obedience to authority, utilitarian compliance, socialization, 
reputational concerns, or norm internalization”). See also GOLDSMITH & 
POSNER , supra note 50, at 165. 
 84. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER , supra note 50; but see, Alford & Tierney, 
supra note 83 (arguing that moral reasoning plays a role in the decision-
making of agents acting on behalf of states). 
 85. See supra notes 28 and 29and accompanying text. 
 86. See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 20 at 151 (arguing that 
“whenever implemented, the rule of law . . . should always be subject to 
evaluation from the standpoint of justice” and discussing, among other 
conceptions of the rule of law, the various ways through which theorists have 
understood justice as a component of the rule of law). An example of a theory 
of justice that is yet to be operationalized is the “capabilities approach” in 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Global 
Justice, 32 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 3, 4 (2004); see also AMARTYA SEN, 
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 87 (1999). 
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justice is a difficult task that is both philosophical and political 
at its core. This Note does not attempt to present one.
87
 Instead, 
because this is fundamentally an institutional design problem, 
the Note focuses on the socio-legal cooperative or coordinative 
conditions that would be necessary for the implementation of 
any theory of justice that might be later developed or 
implemented. 
 
A. SOME ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF A USABLE 
INTERNATIONAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 
 
The idea of finding the meaning of justice is a serious 
intellectual exercise, which is often relegated to moral or 
political philosophy and shunned by international lawyers 
because it smacks of utopianism or “legal idealism.”
88
 Despite 
the perception that such an effort represents a reversion from 
positivist
89
 to naturalist
90
 legal thinking, it is nonetheless 
important to know at what precisely the international rule of 
law is aimed if its normative content is to become clearer and 
made more effectual.  
The theory might take the form of a document such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or other General 
Assembly resolution articulating broad principles and then 
eventually branching out and developing into more concrete 
norms in various instruments. First, it would need to identify 
the ethical foundations of and the principles that underpin 
 
 87. See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 179 (rev. ed. 1999); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A 
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 5 (1983); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 11 (1971). 
 88. See generally G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (1983) (discussing the sources of international law). 
 89. Legal positivism is a philosophical position which emphasizes a view 
of international law derived not from absolute principles but rather from an 
empirical study of how states interact—the agreements states enter into and 
custom are its basis. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
26 (5th ed. 2003).  
 90. Theorists adhering to this view, common in the 1600s, argued that 
state practice and treaties could never be sources of international law as it 
was to be thought of primarily as a part of natural law; the emphasis was on 
what states ought to do rather than on what they did. See, e.g., SAMUEL 
PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI DUO [THE 
TWO BOOKS OF THE ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE] 168 (William 
Abbott Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1931). For a contemporary 
discussion of natural law see THE THREADS OF NATURAL LAW: UNRAVELLING A 
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION (Francisco José Contreras ed., 2013). 
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international law. Second, although it is a widely accepted 
principle of international law, the theory would need to explain 
in greater detail the idea of sovereign equality and its 
limitations as it tends to have a profound impact on inter-state 
relations.
91
 Third, it would also need to articulate principles 
explaining the idea of “fairness” and present criteria 
articulating how it might look when implemented within the 
context of specific international legal regimes.  
Although it is unlikely that an intractable principle like 
“justice” would be defined in such a manner as to garner the 
support of all states, there are many aspects of the principle 
that would. Controversy over the substantive aspects of 
“equality” and the precise boundaries of extraterritorial 
obligations, for example, will likely continue; however, other 
principles such as liberty and opportunity would likely garner 
immediate if not universal support. Within this context, such 
tensions are not to be taken as evidence of the politics that 
obstructs the actualization of an international rule of law, but 
rather as a normal aspect of the political bargaining that occurs 
in the process of norm creation, maturation, and diffusion.
92
  
 
B. INCORPORATING A THEORY OF JUSTICE INTO 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Adding a theory of justice to understandings of the 
international rule of law would be beneficial to the 
international system in several ways. First, it would help to 
clarify the legal content of the international rule of law and 
move it from simply being an emerging norm to maturity. 
Articulating the precise goal of the norm would make it 
possible to begin to formulate less ambiguous rule of law 
elements. Currently, the ambiguity in descriptions of elements 
of the rule of law makes it difficult to assess the norm’s 
maturation and, more importantly, how to make it more 
effectual. Measurement and assessment are particularly 
important because the maturation of the norm could lead to the 
creation of globally justiciable rule of law norms upon which 
case law might eventually be built, further aiding the diffusion 
 
 91. See brief discussion of impact of unequal bargaining power on 
interstate relations under Section II (A). 
 92. See generally Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 888 (1998) 
(discussing norm diffusion in international relations). 
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of the norm within and among states.
93
 Moreover, given that 
the goals noted in the U.N. Charter already present an 
understanding of international justice,
94
 the development of a 
theory of justice would help to create and advance concrete and 
usable standards that bring current understandings of the 
international rule of law in line with the vision of the drafters 
of the Charter. 
Second, grounding the rule of law in a theory of justice 
would provide a much-needed regulatory framework in the 
context of international rule creation. Thus far, rules are 
created in various fora with few checks for consistency with 
other international norms.
95
 The result is the fragmentation of 
international law and the development of self-contained 
regimes.
96
 A substantive theory of justice would provide a filter 
through which various rules of international law may be tested 
for fairness and a way to begin to operationalize the thick 
concept of the rule of law envisioned by the drafters of the 
Charter. A well-articulated theory of justice might be a 
particularly useful filter in the negotiation of free trade 
agreements. Requiring that such agreements pass a rule of law 
or justice test before they are deemed legally acceptable would 
go a long way towards meaningfully leveling the playing field.  
Third, adding a theory of justice to the rule of law would 
likely grant the norm greater legitimacy, particularly among 
weaker states. Although this alone is unlikely to change states’ 
practice of prioritizing national self-interest, it would create a 
framework within which collective self-interest might become 
embedded in the system in much the same way that national 
self-interest is. This would, in turn, promote the U.N.’s vision of 
international cooperation.
97
 Moreover, suspicions that the idea 
of the rule of law is a political tool used to enforce the will of 
the most influential states would likely be lessened if an 
adequate theory of justice were made a core component of the 
international law corpus. 
The preceding benefits are, of course, only theoretical. 
Given the high stakes involved, one of the most significant 
challenges would be getting states to agree not only with 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See generally, U.N. Charter Preamble. 
 95. See generally, Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 33 at ¶ 
34. 
 96. See generally, id. at ¶ 44. 
 97. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; art. 13, para. 1; art. 56. 
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regard to the substantive aspects of the theory, but also on 
other preliminary and highly political matters such as who 
would be tasked with the drafting of the instrument. The 
International Law Commission—the independent body of 
experts within the U.N. tasked with codifying all the essential 
principles of public international law, and filling in the gaps to 
ensure continuity— would likely be the appropriate organ for 
this monumental task.
98
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As a norm, the international rule of law has the potential 
to positively impact inter-state relations. However, simply 
building institutions around it, while ignoring its conceptual 
challenges, will do little to bring it to maturity. This Note has 
demonstrated that although the concept has a fundamental 
flaw in its logic, namely the denial of law’s political nature, its 
greatest weakness is that it exists to promote justice yet it 
lacks a usable theory of justice. Without such a theory, when 
applied to international affairs the rule of law cannot attain the 
goals of justice noted in the U.N. Charter. Instead, it easily 
becomes what it does not want to be: a sophisticated form of 
politics that perpetuates the imbalances within the 
international system. 
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